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NOTES
CLOSING ONE DOOR ON THE PARENT-CHILD
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE: LEGISLATURE REJECTS THE
DECISION OF Coffey v. Coffey
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of parent-child immunity began in the American
legal system to preserve harmony and tranquility among family
members.' The rationale was that suits between members of a fam-
ily unit would destroy the management of the h6me and cause so-
cial disorder and civic decay.' North Carolina adopted the parent-
child immunity doctrine in 1923. 3 The doctrine provides that an
unemancipated minor child cannot maintain an action against his
parents for personal injuries.4 Conversely, the child's immunity is
considered reciprocal of the parent's immunity.' Neither a parent
nor his personal representative is allowed to bring an action
against an unemancipated minor child for a personal tort.' The
doctrine of parent-child immunity is entirely a creation of the
courts.7 Yet, the courts in North Carolina have consistently refused
to abrogate parent-child immunity without legislative action.8
1. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 127 (1978).
2. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584, 118 S.E. 12, 15 (1923).
3. Id.
4. Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 321, 139 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1965).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 127 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 203 (1972)(uneman-
cipated minor cannot bring action against parent for wrongful death); Foster v.
Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 142 S.E.2d 638 (1965)(unemancipated minor cannot main-
tain tort action against parent even after reaching majority); Gillikin v. Burbage,
263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965)(unemancipated minor cannot maintain tort
action against parent for injuries, even though parent's liability is covered by lia-
bility insurance); Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952)(un-
emancipated minor child cannot maintain a tort action against his parents);
Camp v. Camp, 89 N.C. App. 347, 365 S.E.2d 675 (1988)(parent cannot bring ac-
1
Baker: Closing One Door on the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine: Legislatu
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
The unwillingness of the North Carolina courts to abolish the
judicially created parent-child immunity doctrine prompted legis-
lative action in 1975.1 The North Carolina legislature enacted N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 which abolished a parent's immunity to suit,
but only in motor vehicle cases.10 In effect, parents injured in mo-
tor vehicle accidents by the negligence of their children were una-
ble to sue their unemancipated minor children.11
In Coffey v. Coffey,1 2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
once again refused to abrogate parent-child immunity and allow a
parent to maintain an action against a child even though the child
had reached the age of majority at the time of the lawsuit.1 3 How-
ever, the court of appeals allowed the plaintiff-mother to join the
father as a party defendant under the family purpose doctrine.
1 4
Following the decision in Coffey, the North Carolina legisla-
ture amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 and completely abolished
parent-child immunity in motor vehicle cases. 5 The amendment
rejects the Coffey decision and allows parents to sue a child for
injuries caused by the child's negligent operation of a motor
vehicle.1
This Note has four objectives. First, this Note will summarize
the facts of Coffey. Second, this Note will review the history of
parent-child immunity and the role of the family purpose doctrine
in cases involving parent-child immunity in automobile cases.
Third, this Note will analyze the Coffey case, the North Carolina
Legislature's abolishment of parent-child immunity in motor vehi-
cle cases, and possible alternatives to the parent-child immunity
doctrine in cases other than those involving motor vehicles.
Fourth, this Note will suggest that the North Carolina courts are
not powerless to abrogate parent-child immunity. The courts
tion against minor child for injuries sustained in accident involving automobile
operated by child).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1975).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 381 S.E.2d 467 (1989), aff'd, 326 N.C.
586, 391 S.E.2d 40 (1990).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 723, 381 S.E.2d at 471. The family purpose doctrine is a legal fic-
tion that imputes liability to the owner of a motor vehicle when a member of his
family commits a tort while driving his car. Note, Use of The Family Purpose
Doctrine When No Outsiders Are Involved, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 243 (1985).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1989)
16. Id.
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should take the initiative to modernize the judicially created par-
ent-child immunity doctrine as it applies to tort actions between
parents and their children.
THE CASE
On January 27, 1988, Elvera A. Coffey sued her nineteen-year-
old son, Michael Coffey, alleging that she sustained injuries from
his negligent operation of an automobile in which she was a pas-
senger. 7 The accident occurred on August 17, 1985 when the de-
fendant was sixteen years old and was living with the plaintiff. s
The parties stipulated that the defendant was the unemancipated
minor son of the plaintiff at the time of the accident.'9 Prior to
trial, plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to join Clayton Cof-
fey, the defendant's father, as a party defendant.20 Plaintiff alleged
that the father was liable under the family purpose doctrine. 2' The
trial court denied plaintiff's motion to amend" without assigning
reasons. Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
on the basis it failed "to state a claim upon which relief [could] be
granted."24 The trial court thereafter granted summary judgment
for the defendant and dismissed the case with prejudice.25
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendant was an
adult on the date the complaint was filed and was no longer im-
mune from an action by a parent.26 Specifically, the plaintiff ar-
17. Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 718, 381 S.E.2d 467, 468 (1989).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or,. if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the ac-
tion has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at
any time within 30 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 30 days after ser-
vice of the amended pleading, unless the court otherwise orders.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 15(a) (1983).
23. Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 718, 381 S.E.2d 467, 468 (1989).
24. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
25. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 718, 381 S.E.2d at 468.
26. Id. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
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gued that when a child reaches the age of majority the rule prohib-
iting a parent's action against a child should not apply because one
of the reasons for the rule, the maintenance of the family relation-
ship, no longer exists.27 The plaintiff also argued that the trial
court erred in not allowing the defendant's father to be joined as a
party defendant. under the family purpose doctrine.2 "
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court
and held that "the right to sue must exist at the time of the injury
and the subsequent emancipation or majority of the minor is of no
consequencce."2 9 However, the court of appeais reversed the trial
court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend to join the father as a
defendant under the family purpose doctrine.3" The court of ap-
peals found the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion an
abuse of descretion 1 The court held .that under North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure 20(a)32 and 21,33 joining the defendant's
27. Id. See infra note 54 and accompanying text listing five policy reasons
supporting the parent-child immunity doctrine.
28. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 721, 381 S.E.2d at 470.
29. Id. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
30. Id. at 722, 381 S.E.2d at 471. The court noted that absent any declared
reasons for denial of leave to amend, the appellate court can examine apparent
reasons for the denial. Apparent reasons include: undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice and futility of the
amendment. The court reasoned that since the trial court did not state reasons,
none were apparent. The court found this an abuse of discretion. Id. However,
Rule 15(a) does not specifically require the trial judge to state reasons for denial
of a motion to amend pleadings. See supra note 22.
31. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 722, 381 S.E.2d at 471.
32. Rule 20(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(a) Permissive joinder.-All persons may join in one action as plain-
tiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alterna-
tive in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all parties will arise in the action. All persons may be joined
in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or aris-
ing out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all parties will
arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in
obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be
given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights
to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respec-
tive liabilities.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 20(a) (1983)(emphasis added).
33. Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
[Vol. 13:105
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father was permissible and notice was served without delay.34 Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case to allow the de-
fendant's father to be joined in the action.3 5
Judge Lewis dissented to reversing the denial of the motion to
amend the complaint a.3 He noted that the majority opinion put the
appellate court in the position of legislating how much time consti-
tutes undue delay. 7 He determined that the trial judge is in a bet-
ter position to exercise such discretion .3
BACKGROUND
A. History of Parent-Child Immunity
At common law, there was no immunity between parents and
children for their torts.39 The doctrine of parent-child immunity
was first introduced in 1891 in the case of Hewlett v. George."' In
Hewlett, a minor child brought an action against her mother's es-
tate for illegal imprisonment in an insane asylum.4' The daughter
alleged that the mother was motivated by a desire for the daugh-
ter's property. 2 The court would not allow the daughter's claim
stating:
[T]he peace of society, and of the families composing society, and
a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interest of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent."3
Neither misjoinder of parties nor misjoinder of parties and claims is
ground for dismissal of an action; but on such terms as are just parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. Any claim against a
party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 21 (1983)(emphasis added).
34. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 721, 381 S.E.2d at 470. Plaintiff served a copy of
the proposed amendment on defendant Michael Coffey notifying him that she
would appear in court on a specified day to request an order allowing amendment.
Id.
35. Id. at 723, 381 S.E.2d at 471.
36. Id. at 723, 381 S.E.2d at 471-72 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 127 (1978).
40. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
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The court based its argument solely on the fear that civil actions
between parents and children would disrupt the family unit and
society." Gradually, courts in other states also adopted the parent-
child immunity doctrine.45
North Carolina first used the doctrine of parent-child immu-
nity in the case of Small v. Morrison.4 6 In Small, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court denied a minor's claim against her father for
injuries sustained in an automobile collision. 7 The court stated
that "[f]rom the very beginning, the family in its integrity has
been the foundation of American institutions, and we are not now
disposed to depart from this basic principle.""8 The Small decision
set precedent and was rigorously adhered to by the North Carolina
courts. 9
Thus, the general rule emerged in North Carolina that "an Un-
emancipated minor child cannot maintain a tort action against his
parents for personal injuries, even though the parent's liability is
covered by liability insurance." 50 Furthermore, the child's immu-
nity is considered reciprocal of the parent's immunity and bars
tort actions by parents against their unemancipated minor
children.51
In Skinner v. Whitley, the North Carolina Supreme Court was
urged to abolish parent-child immunity in a wrongful death action
but refused to do so.52 The plaintiff argued that the death of fam-
ily members removed the family relationship and the reason for
the rule."a The court rejected this theory and gave five policy rea-
sons supporting the doctrine: "(1) disturbance of domestic tran-
quility, (2) danger of fraud and collusion, (3) depletion of family
[funds], (4) the possibility of inheritance, by the parent, of the
amount recovered in damages by the child, and (5) the interference
44. Id. The court also stated: "But so long as the parent is under obligation
to care for, guide and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid
and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained." Id.
45. See generally McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903);
Roller v Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713,
156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Parks v Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
46. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 584, 118 S.E. at 15.
49. See supra note 8.
50. Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 321, 139 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1965).
51. Id.
52. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972).
53. Id. at 479, 189 S.E.2d at 232.
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with parental care, discipline and control." '5 The court refused to
abolish or modify the parent-child immunity doctrine which began
nearly 50 years prior to the Skinner case.55 The court stated that
"total abrogation of the immunity rule would lead to judicial su-
pervision over the conduct of parent and child in the ordinary op-
eration of the household. . ... Piecemeal abrogation of established
law by judicial decree is, like a partial amputation, ordinarily un-
wise and usually unsuccessful. '56 However, the court noted that if
the immunity rule in ordinary negligence cases is no longer suited
to the times, change should occur "prospectively by legislation
rather than retroactively by judicial decree." 57
B. Enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21
Legislative action was taken with regard to the parent-child
immunity doctrine as it relates to motor vehicle cases.5 8 In 1975,
the North Carolina Legislature enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
539.21 which provides:
Abolition of parent-child immunity in motor vehicle
cases.
The relationship of parent and child shall not bar the right of
action by a minor child against a parent for personal injury or
property damages arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle
owned or operated by such parent.6
North Carolina General Statute § 1-539.21 abolished parent
child immunity only in motor vehicle cases.6 1 The growing number
of automobile accidents and the existence of compulsory automo-
bile liability insurance resulted in legislative action.2 However, the
statute abolished only a parent's immunity to suit.6 3 Therefore,
parents injured by their children's negligence in motor vehicle
cases were still unable to bring actions against their unemanci-
54. Id. at 480, 189 S.E.2d at 232.
55. Id. at 484, 189 S.E.2d at 235.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1975).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 492, 342 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1986).
63. Allen v. Allen, 315 N.C. App. 504, 506, 333 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1985).
1990]
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pated minor children. 4
Ledwell v. Berry 5 challenged the constitutionality of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 on the basis of the equal protection clauses of
the North Carolina and United States Constitutions. In LedweU1, a
minor child sued his parents for personal injuries that allegedly
resulted from the parent's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 6
The parents argued that by removing only the parent's immunity
to suit, and not the child's, the North Carolina Legislature had cre-
ated an arbitrary classification to which the doctrine of parent-
child immunity did not apply.67 The parents contended this classi-
fication was not based on a reasonable distinction.6 8 The court held
that the statute was constitutional and the class recognized by the
North Carolina Legislature was based on a reasonable distinction. 9
North Carolina General Statute § 1-539.21 was challenged
again in Allen v. Allen.70 In Allen, a parent sued her sixteen-year-
old son for injuries she sustained while riding in an automobile op-
erated by the son.7 The plaintiff-mother argued that the title of
the statute "Abolition of Parent-Child Immunity in Motor Vehicle
Cases" should be used in construing the meaning of the statute.72
Specifically,- the plaintiff asserted that the title implied total aboli-
tion of the parent-child immunity doctrine in motor vehicle
cases.7" The plaintiff's final contention was that the statute vio-
lated the substantive due process and equal protection require-
ments of the North Carolina and United States Constitutions."
The Allen court held that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 abolished
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 was amended in 1989 allowing parents to sue
their children for negligence in motor vehicle accidents. The effective date of the
amendment is August 12, 1989. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1989). See.infra
note 149 and accompanying text.
65. 39 N.C. App. 224, 249 S.E.2d 862 (1978), disc. rev. denied 296 N.C. 585,
254 S.E.2d 35 (1979).
66. Id. at 224, 249 S.E.2d at 863.
67. Id. at 225, 249 S.E.2d at 863.
68. Id. at 226, 249 S.E.2d at 864. "Any law adopted by the General Assembly
must have a reasonable relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose
and must not be unreasonable in degree in comparison with the probably public
benefit." Id. at 225, 249 S.E.2d at 863 (citing Indemnity Co. v. Ingram Comm'r of
Ins., 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976)).
69. Ledwell, 39 N.C. App. at 226, 249 S.E.2d at 864.
70. 76 N.C. App. 504, 333 S.E.2d 530 (1985).
71. Id. at 505, 333 S.E.2d at 532.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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only a parent's immunity to suit.7" The Allen court reasoned that a
statute's title may be considered where there is confusion in the
text but in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 the legislative intent was
clearly expressed and was controlling."6 Finally, the Allen court
followed Ledwel17 and held that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 was
constitutional and did not violate the state and federal equal pro-
tection clauses.78 The court also reasoned that "[§] 1-539.21 [did]
not violate substantive due process because it [did] not deny plain-
tiff a right to which she would otherwise be entitled. 7'9 The court
stated: "To hold that an established right was taken away because
the statute did not open the same door for parents is incorrect.
Even if one views [§] 1-539.21 as 'denying' parents of such a right,
such denial is within the rights of the legislature.' '
The enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 placed a signifi-
cant limitation on the parent-child immunity doctrine. However,
the statute abolished only a parent's immunity from suit." The
statute continued to leave parents who were injured by their chil-
dren's negligent driving without compensation. 2
C. Use of the Family Purpose Doctrine
The family purpose doctrine has been invoked by parents in
suits against their children when such actions would have other-
wise been barred by the parent-child immunity doctrine.8 3 The
family purpose doctrine is based on the rule of respondeat superior
and the principles of agency. 4 The family purpose doctrine im-
putes liability to the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation
of that vehicle by a member of the owner's household.8" Owner lia-
bility is imposed:
75. Id.
76. Id. at 505-06, 333 S.E.2d at 532.
77. See supra note 65.
78. Allen v. Allen, 76 N.C. App. 504, 506, 333 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1985).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 504, 333 S.E.2d at 532.
82. Id.; see also, Camp v. Camp, 89 N.C. App. 347, 365 S.E.2d 675 (1988).
83. E.g., Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965) (A child's negli-
gent operation of an automobile caused the death of his mother, a passenger in
the car. The mother's estate's action was barred against the minor child but was
allowed against the husband-father under the family purpose doctrine.).
84. Note, Automobile Agency-Family Purpose Doctrine - Wife's Liability for
Husband's Negligence, 38 N.C.L. REV. 249, 249 (1960).
85. Williams v. Trust Co., 292 N.C. 416, 419-20, 233 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1977).
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When it is shown (1) that the operator was a member of [the
owner's] family or household and was living in his home, (2) that
the vehicle was owned, provided and maintained for the general
use, pleasure and convenience of [the owner's] family, and (3)
that the vehicle was being so used by a member of [the owner's]
family at the time of the accident with his express or implied
consent."
The family purpose doctrine "came into being as an instrument of
social policy to afford greater protection for the rapidly growing
number of motorists in the United States."87
The family purpose doctrine was typically used when the au-
tomobile owner's child negligently caused an accident that resulted
in injury, death or property damage to a non-family member.88
However, plaintiffs have tried to use the doctrine to recover in
cases where the suit would be barred by parent-child immunity.89
For example, suppose that a parent is injured in a car accident
caused by his child's negligent driving." The child's negligence can
be imputed to the noninjured parent under the family purpose
doctrine.9 1 The injured parent can then file suit against the
noninjured parent and in effect recover on the basis of the child's
negligence. 2
The most recent case in which recovery was allowed is Cox v.
Shaw." In Cox, the plaintiff alleged that the deceased minor
child's negligent operation of an automobile caused the death of
his mother, a passenger in the car." The mother's estate brought
an action against the father and the son's administratrix.9 5 Parent-
child immunity barred the suit against the son's administratrix 6
86. Id.
87. Note, supra note 84, at 252-53.
88. Note, Use of The Family Purpose Doctrine When No Outsiders Are In-
volved, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 243, 248 (1985).
89. See, e.g., Camp v. Camp, 89 N.C. App. 347, 365 S.E.2d 675 (1988) (wife
not allowed to recover from husband under family purpose doctrine for injuries
caused by daughter's negligent operation of automobile because there was a ques-
tion as to who had control of the automobile); Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139
S.E.2d 676 (1965).
90. See generally Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
94. Id. at 362, 139 S.E.2d at 678.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 363, 139 S.E.2d at 678.
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The action was allowed against the father by imputing the son's
negligence to the father under the family purpose doctrine.9 7 A
verdict for the mother's estate was returned against the father.98
However, only the daughter who was not involved in the accident
participated in the judgment.9 Judgment was entered for one-
third of the amount of the verdict to prevent the father and the
son's estate from benefitting from the recovery.'
ANALYSIS
The court in Coffey was faced with the question of whether
the defendant, who had reached the age of majority at the time of
the lawsuit, was immune from suit by his parent for negligent con-
duct that occurred when he was an unemancipated minor.' 0 1 The
court held that the doctrine of parent-child immunity barred the
action. 102 The court refused to carve out an exception to the doc-
trine even though the defendant was of majority at the time of the
suit.10 3 The following sections will examine policy rationales sup-
porting the parent-child immunity doctrine as the rationales apply
to the Coffey case and as to other actions in tort between parents
and their children.
A. The Court's Reasoning
1. The Public Policy Rationale
As stated previously, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
based parent-child immunity on various public policies. These in-
clude: "(1) disturbance of domestic tranquility, (2) danger of fraud
and collusion, (3) depletion of the family [funds], (4) the possibil-
ity of inheritance, by the parent, of the amount recovered in dam-
ages by the child, and (5) interference with parental discipline and
control."' 04 The policy reasons have lost much of their force over
the years, particularly when the child being sued has reached ma-
jority. 10 Only the first policy reason was addressed directly by the
97. Id. at 367, 139 S.E.2d at 680.
98. Id. at 368, 139 S.E.2d at 681.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 718, 381 S.E.2d 467, 468 (1989).
102. Id. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
103. Id.
104. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 480, 189 S.E.2d 203, 232 (1972).
105. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 718, 381 S.E.2d at 486.
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court in Coffey. °6 However, the remaining four policy reasons
should also be considered in determining whether the parent-child
immunity doctrine is consistent with modern day public policy or
should be abolished in all contexts. 07
First, the Coffey court considered the effect of suits between
parents and children on domestic tranquility.' 8 The court refused
to allow the plaintiff to sue her minor son after he reached the age
of majority stating that "[sluch a purposeful delay would itself
contravene domestic tranquility, one of the policy reasons support-
ing immunity."1 ° Though the prevention of disturbance of domes-
tic tranquility is one of the strongest arguments supporting parent-
child immunity, it has serious flaws."' First, once an injury has
occurred family harmony is disturbed. 1 ' Refusing to compensate
for the injury does not help domestic tranquility and could cause
more problems within the family unit.1 1 2 Second, under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-539.21 a child is allowed to sue his parent for personal
injuries and property damage caused by the parent's negligent op-
eration of a motor vehicle." 3 This is inconsistent with the family
harmony rationale. Furthermore, recovery is not limited to the
amount of insurance coverage."' Third, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court allows a parent injured by a child's negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle to sue the noninjured parent under the
family purpose doctrine." 5 A parent suing a child directly would
not upset domestic tranquility any more than a child suing a par-
ent"6 or a parent suing another parent by virtue of the family pur-
pose doctrine." 7
The danger of fraud and collusion is the second public policy
106. Id.
107. See generally Comment, The Last Pangs of Parent-Child Immunity in
North Carolina: Lee v. Mowett Sales Co. and Allen v. Allen, 22 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 607 (1987).
108. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 720, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
109. Id.
110. Comment, supra note 107, at 618.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1975).
114. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 492, 342 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1986)
(The existence of compulsory liability insurance in North Carolina was a factor
that prompted legislative enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21.).
115. See, e.g., Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1985).
117. See generally Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
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rationale for parent-child immunity.11 8 The existence of insurance
could give family members a motive to initiate suits to gain unjus-
tified awards from insurance companies."' N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
539.21 rejects the danger of fraud and collusion rationale by al-
lowing the child to sue the parent. 2 ° Fraud and collusion is no
more likely to occur when a parent sues a child than when a child
sues a parent.2 ' Furthermore, the potential for fraud and collusion
exists in all litigation.' 2 In actions between family members courts
should determine issues of fraud and collusion through impeach-
ment by cross-examination.2"
The third public policy rationale, the depletion of family
funds, has been somewhat weakened by North Carolina's
mandatory liability insurance requirements.'24 This argument also
ignores the fact that parent-child immunity does not apply to ac-
tions by minors with respect to contract and property rights.'25 Re-
covery in contract and property actions are usually paid out of
pocket while judgments from automobile accidents are covered by
mandatory liability insurance.' 26
The fourth public policy rationale, the possibility of inheri-
tance by the.parent or child of any damages recovered by the in-
jured party, is a weak argument at best. 7 Inheritance of an award
by a tortfeasor is possible in any intrafamily suit.' However,
other family members are allowed to sue each other.'29 Further-
more, the court could fashion relief to eliminate any enrichment of
the tortfeasor as it did in Cox v. Shaw.1 30
Finally, the fifth public policy concern that a cause of action
between a parent and child would interfere with parental control
118. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 480, 189 S.E.2d 203, 232 (1972).
119. Comment, supra note 107, at 618.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1985).
121. Id.
122. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 563, 334 S.E.2d 250, 254
(1985)(Becton, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.1 (1983).
125. 3 R. LEE, North Carolina Family Law § 247 (4th ed. 1981).
126. Comment, supra note 107, at 618.
127. Note, Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.: North Carolina Retains its Partial Par-
ent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1457, 1461 (1987).
128. Id.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1965)(tort actions allowed between husband and
wife).
130. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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does not apply to Coffey."' In Coffey the child had reached the age
of majority when the lawsuit was filed and thus was no longer
under the same parental controls as an unemancipated minor.'32
This argument also falters by allowing the child to sue the parent
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21."33 A child suing a parent would
more likely interfere with parental control than a parent suing a
child.1 3 1
2. Stare Decisis
In addition to public policy concerns, the Coffey court relied
on stare decisis to reach its decision. 135 The Coffey court cited Al-
len v. Allen' 36 as being entirely consistent with its holding.'37 In
Allen, a parent sued her minor son for negligent conduct that oc-
curred on April 23, 1980 when the son was sixteen years old. 13 The
son was at least eighteen years old when the complaint was filed on
April 22, 1983.139 The court dismissed the parent's action against
her son because of parent-child immunity.' ° The fact situation in
Allen is very similar to Coffey. Though the holdings were consis-
tent, the question of whether parent-child immunity should exist
when a child's negligence occurs when the child is a minor but the
lawsuit is brought after the child reaches majority, was not directly
addressed by the Allen court.''
Although the parent-child immunity doctrine was judicially
created, North Carolina courts have refused to abrogate parent-
child immunity without legislative action. 42 The Coffey court ad-
hered to stare decisis by following these decisions. 43 Yet, the
North Carolina courts are not powerless to abrogate the parent-
child immunity doctrine. "4" This is shown by the courts' alterations
131. Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 381 S.E.2d 467 (1989).
132. Id. at 718, 381 S.E.2d at 468.
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1985).
134. See Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 381 S.E.2d 467 (1989).
135. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 720, 381 S.E.2d at 470.
136. Allen v. Allen, 76 N.C. App. 504, 33 S.E.2d 530 (1985).
137. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 720, 381 S.E.2d at 470.
138. Allen, 76 N.C. App. at 505, 333 S.E.2d at 531.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 507, 333 S.E.2d at 533.
141. See Allen v. Allen, 76 N.C. App. 504, 333 S.E.2d 530 (1985).
142. See supra note 8.
143. Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 720, 381 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1989).
144. Note, supra note 127, at 1473.
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of other judicially created common law rules.'45 The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court abandoned the charitable immunity of hospi-
tals in 1975 and stated, "[tihis court has never overruled its deci-
sions lightly. No court has been more faithful to stare decisis ...
Nevertheless, when the duty seemed clear, it has done so."'" The
duty to abandon the doctrine of parent-child immunity was clear
in Coffey.
B. Legislative Reaction to Coffey
On August 12, 1989, after the court of appeals decision in Cof-
fey, the General Assembly amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21.1, 7
The amendment abolished a child's immunity from tort actions by
his parents for injuries arising out of the operation of a motor vehi-
cle.' 4 8 The statute provides:
The relationship of parent and child shall not bar the right of
action by a person or his estate against his parent or child for
wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out
of the operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the par-
ent or child.4 9
The North Carolina courts have not decided a case under this
statute.
The majority of North Carolina cases involving parent-child
immunity have arisen in the context of motor vehicle accidents.'50
However, the erosion of the public policy rationales supporting the
doctrine of parent-child immunity is visible in other tort actions.'
It is reasonable to infer that the legislature abrogated parent-child
immunity only in motor vehicle cases because this is where the ma-
jority of cases arise. 52 Therefore, the courts should not necessarily
construe legislative action in this area as an intent to leave the
parent-child immunity doctrine otherwise in tact.
145. Id.
146. Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, 269 N.C. 1, 20, 132 S.E.2d 485, 498
(1967).
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 comment (Supp. 1989).
148. Id. at § 1-539.21.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Note, supra note 127, at 1473.
151. See generally Comment, supra note 107.
152. Note, supra note 143, at 1473.
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C. Possible Alternatives
1. The Goller Approach
In 1963, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the parent-
child immunity doctrine would only apply when (1) the allegedly
negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the
child, or (2) the allegedly negligent act involves an exercise of ordi-
nary parental discretion with regard to the provision of food, cloth-
ing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.153
The Goller approach determines whether the injury arose out
of parental authority or discipline over the child.154 If the injury
arose out of parental authority or discipline, the claim is not ac-
tionable.' 55 Problems with the Goller approach arise in deciding
which activities constitute the exercise of parental authority. 5 '
However, the Goller approach preserves parental authority and
discretion while recognizing that there are other torts that do not
involve parental control. 7 Injured parents and children are al-
lowed to seek recovery where justification for the parent-child im-
munity doctrine does not exist. 8 In contrast, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
539.21 only recognizes torts in motor vehicle cases. 159
2. The Gibson Approach
The California Supreme Court totally abrogated the parent-
child immunity doctrine and adopted a reasonably prudent parent
standard in Gibson v. Gibson. 60 In Gibson, a father stopped his
car on the highway and asked his child to get out of the car and
adjust the wheels of a jeep they were towing.' The child was in-
jured by another automobile.'62 The court completely abrogated
the parent-child immunity doctrine and decided that the parent's
conduct should be judged by what an ordinarily reasonable pru-
dent parent would have done under the circumstances.6 3 The
153. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Note, supra note 127, at 1470.
157. Comment, supra note 107, at 621.
158. Id.
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1989).
160. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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court also noted that parental relationships such as disciplining
and control of development should be judged separately.' 4 The
strongest criticism of the Gibson approach is that courts are not in
a position to decide what constitutes reasonable parental behavoir
in the context of parental discipline and supervision.'6" However,
Gibson considers the surrounding circumstances of each case
before imposing liability. 66 Therefore, the Gibson approach allows
for a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances.'67
3. The Restatement Approach
The Restatement (Second) of Torts supports the Gibson rea-
sonably prudent parent standard.'68 It improves this standard by
noting what actions should not give rise to liability.1 69 The Re-
statement explains that family relationships:
[I]nvolve intended physical contacts that would be actionable be-
tween strangers [but] may be commonplace and expected within
the family. Family romping, even roughhouse. play and momen-
tary flares of temper not producing serious hurt may become nor-
mal in many households, to the point that the privilege arising
from consent becomes analogous.'
Although the Restatement approach can be criticised for placing
courts in the position of deciding what constitutes reasonable pa-
rental behavior, the approach expands the Gibson test by setting
guidelines.' 7 ' The approach allows for more favorable judicial
review. 72
Presently, the public policy rationales behind the parent-child
immunity doctrine are almost non-existent. 73 The legislature par-
tially corrected the problems with the parent-child immunity doc-
trine by amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 after the Coffey deci-
sion.7 4 However, an analysis of the policy rationale's behind the
164. Id.
165. See supra note 127, at 1471.
166. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288, 293 (1971).
167. Id.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1977).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 127, at 1461.
173. See notes 104-34 and accompanying text
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1989).
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doctrine implies that further abrogation may be needed. The Gol-
ler, Gibson and Restatement approaches all preserve parental au-
thority and discretion.' 75 Yet, these approaches are balanced with
the need to allow compensation for injuries that arise in other situ-
ations.'76 The Restatement approach appears to be the best option
because it takes into consideration the uniqueness of family rela-
tionships and gives guidelines for the courts to follow.'77
CONCLUSION
The Coffey court refused to abrogate parent-child immunity
even though Michael Coffey had reached the age of majority and
none of the public policy reasons supporting the doctrine were pre-
sent.178 The Coffey court ignored the rationale behind parent-child
immunity and followed stare decisis.1 79 Thus, the court refused to
abrogate a doctrine that was judicially created.
The legislature's recognition of the problem with parent-child
immunity prompted an amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
539.21.180 While the amendment was a step in the right direction,
the approach taken by the legislature does not adequately allow
compensation for intrafamily tort injuries. The use of one of the
noted tests would better serve modern society. Perhaps the courts
should view the legislature's reaction to Coffey as a signal to review
and possibly abrogate the parent-child immunity doctrine. It ap-
pears that the piecemeal approach feared by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 197281 has been adopted by the legislature.'8 2
The courts are in a better position to judge the uniqueness of the
parent-child relationship and re-establish the parent-child immu-
nity doctrine consistent with modern day public policy.
Elizabeth Ashley Baker
175. See supra notes 153-72 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G (1977).
178. Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 719, 381 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1989).
179. Id. at 723, 381 S.E.2d at 470.
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1989).
181. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
182. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 563, 334 S.E.2d 250, 254
(1985)(Becton, J. dissenting).
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